Christopher Hansman, Jonas Hjort, and Gianmarco Leon explore the unintended health consequences of piecemeal regulations that ignore firm’s responses to new incentives by looking at the case of the 2009 Peruvian industrial fishing sector reform.
Roberto Burguet identifies optimal rules for a procurer when he incorporates the possibility that a supplier can bribe the inspector to misrepresent quality.
Does judiciary presence affect a politician’s management or possible graft of public resources? Stephan Litschig and Yves Zamboni estimate the effect of judges and prosecutors on the management of public resources in Brazil.
How much should people be taxed and what should tax revenues be spent on? Surprisingly, these topics have mostly been treated in isolation in academic research. Joan Esteban and Laura Mayoral present a model that determines the consensus income tax schedule, the composition of public expenditure, and the size of government.