Enriqueta Aragonès and Dimitrios Xefteris propose a model explaining political parties’ incentives to flip their policy proposals and nominate candidates of lower perceived quality.
Armed conflicts pose significant challenges for the international community. They prevent countries from developing, lead to a persistent outflow of refugees, and have a significant death-toll. For this reason, the ability of policymakers to prevent outbreaks and escalations is crucial. However, it is not an easy task.
As Jean Monnet, recognized, often it takes a crisis for the EU to move ahead. This has been the case with the COVID-19 crisis and the launch of the Temporary Support to Mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE) mechanism providing, for the first time, financial support (loans at convenient conditions) to member states to…
Federico Boffa, Francisco Cavalcanti, Christian Fons-Rosen and Amedeo Piolatto analyse, theoretically and empirically, the extent of political favouritism in the allocation of discretionary central funds, an allocation often based on political considerations that have little connection with welfare.
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