When Platforms Favor Their Own Services, Who Loses?
Leonardo Madio, Fabio M. Manenti and Massimo Motta show that requiring equal access to a platform’s own service and its rivals raises welfare and the platform’s own profits
Leonardo Madio, Fabio M. Manenti and Massimo Motta show that requiring equal access to a platform’s own service and its rivals raises welfare and the platform’s own profits
Benito Arruñada, Marco Fabbri, and Michael Faure identify a causal effect of policy reform on land-related litigation.
Chiara Fumagalli, Massimo Motta and Emanuele Tarantino study the effects of acquiring potential competitors and the optimal policy for regulating such mergers.
Benito Arruñada argues that institutions’ performance measures should focus more on the reports of the individuals who have experience interacting with them.