The value of managers, a matter of market power?

Renjie Bao, Jan De Loecker, and Jan Eeckhout build and estimate a structural model that decomposes the origins of manager pay into those that are due to market power and those due to firm size.
Renjie Bao, Jan De Loecker, and Jan Eeckhout build and estimate a structural model that decomposes the origins of manager pay into those that are due to market power and those due to firm size.
This article looks at the equilibrium effects of enhancing competition for procurement contracts in prices and execution quality. By focusing on the U.S. Department of Defense, the authors provide empirical evidence on this trade-off to later develop an equilibrium model of competition for contracts.
Cesare Righi and Timothy Simcoe study how inventors use a particular type of patent, called a “continuation”, to obtain protection for technology developed after the original filing date of a first patent, in an attempt to increase licensing revenues.
Ramon Caminal examines the motivation behind time restrictions on loyalty awards and their implications for consumers and firms.