Cesare Righi and Timothy Simcoe study how inventors use a particular type of patent, called a “continuation”, to obtain protection for technology developed after the original filing date of a first patent, in an attempt to increase licensing revenues.
Federico Boffa, Francisco Cavalcanti, Christian Fons-Rosen and Amedeo Piolatto analyse, theoretically and empirically, the extent of political favouritism in the allocation of discretionary central funds, an allocation often based on political considerations that have little connection with welfare.
Stefano Falcone and Michele Rosenberg study the effect of the expansion and intensification of capital-intensive agriculture on land conflict.
Research by Louise Lindbjerg and Theodor Vladasel indicates that former business founders are uniquely endowed with the skills for generating innovation revenue when recruited by firms.
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