Corruption and Renegotiation in Procurement

A government official and a construction firm owner shake hands over blueprints in a clean, blue-toned office. Below, a cross-section reveals dark, intricate pipes and electrical wires, with shadowy hands exchanging a glowing envelope of money.

When government agencies need to hire a company to carry out a project like building a road or providing a public service, they run a bidding process where firms compete by offering prices. This process is called public procurement.

The risk of corruption in public procurement is a serious concern, as it can generate sizable costs for public administrations and, ultimately, tax-payers.

In Barcelona School of Economics Working Paper 1492, “Corruption and Renegotiation in Procurement,” Leandro Arozamena, Juan-José Ganuza, and Federico Weinschelbaum focus on a specific type of corruption that takes place not during the initial bidding process, but rather during the contract renegotiation that usually follows. The authors study how corruption in the renegotiation phase may influence the procurement process while not being detected or prevented by procurement regulations.

Key Insights

  • Corruption is more likely in more competitive markets where profits are low and companies’ operating costs are similar
  • Corruption is less likely when the initial contract awarded is more complete
  • Corruption is less likely when the number of bidders increases

These insights have important implications for the design of procurement processes and regulations, but the solutions are not without challenges.


The Devil is in the Details

In many public procurement processes, the contract with the winning firm isn’t fully detailed from the outset. These “incomplete” contracts may require renegotiation (revisions or adjustments) after the firm has been selected and the project is underway.

If a firm knows that it can bribe an official to secure preferential treatment during the contract renegotiation phase, the incentives at the bidding stage change fundamentally. In such a scenario, the company might be more aggressive during the bidding process in order to increase its chances of winning. 

A dramatic example of this occurred between 2001 and 2016, when Odebrecht, the largest engineering and construction company in Latin America, bribed around 600 politicians and public servants in 10 Latin American countries. According to the US Department of Justice, this corruption case was the largest foreign bribery case in history, accounting for $788 million in bribes.

The Mechanism of Corruption: Distorted Bidding

The model developed by the authors explains how even the possibility of future corruption significantly distorts the initial behavior of companies during the auction.

A firm that anticipates being able to secure preferential treatment through a bribe during renegotiation will bid more aggressively at the initial auction. This means they will offer lower prices, increasing their probability of winning the contract.

This “bait and switch” is an inherent inefficiency and distortion in the procurement process that can create substantial and often hidden costs for public administrations and, ultimately, taxpayers.

When is Corruption More Likely to Occur?

The authors identify three main conditions that significantly increase the likelihood of corruption in public procurement processes:

Less Complete Initial Contracts: The probability of corruption is larger when the initial contract is less complete. Conversely, greater contract completeness reduces the scope for renegotiation and, consequently, the opportunities for this type of corruption.

Similar Firm Costs: Corruption is more likely when the corrupt firm’s cost is more likely to be similar to her rivals’. This scenario is typical in highly competitive markets where firms operate with lower profit margins, making the incentive for preferential treatment through bribes more appealing.

Fewer Competitors: The probability of corruption also increases when the corrupt firm faces fewer competitors in the initial auction. A larger number of bidders generally reduces the likelihood of successful distortion through corruption, as it increases the risk and complexity for the bribing firm.

How to Reduce Corruption in Public Procurement

The paper suggests that effectively tackling this particular form of corruption presents significant challenges for policymakers and government agencies.

From a policy point of view, the authors point out that renegotiation is much harder to regulate than the original procurement auction, but trying to strictly limit renegotiation can backfire and create new problems.

Their analysis shows that to manage renegotiation properly, governments need to start with more detailed contracts. However, drafting such contracts is costly and may be especially difficult for administrations lacking technical expertise, which are often the same ones that are most vulnerable to corruption risks.