Not all firms benefit the same from credit guarantees
Alberto Martin, Sergio Mayordomo, and Victoria Vanasco show that private banks have distorted incentives when deciding how to allocate public credit guarantees.
Fiscal Multipliers and Foreign Holdings of Public Debt
Fernando Broner, Daragh Clancy, Alberto Martín and Aitor Erce suggest that the effects of fiscal expansions in a globalized world depend crucially on how they are financed
Sovereign Debt Crises and Maturity Structures
Raquel Fernández and Alberto Martín explore the role of debt maturity on the frequency with which a country enters a debt crisis and on the severity of the latter.
Managing credit bubbles
Barcelona GSE research on VoxEU.org by Alberto Martín and Jaume Ventura
There is a widespread view among macroeconomists that fluctuations in collateral are an important driver of credit booms and busts. This column distinguishes between ‘fundamental’ collateral – backed by expectations of future profits – and ‘bubbly’ collateral – backed by expectations of future credit. Markets are generically unable to provide the optimal amount of bubbly collateral, which creates a natural role for stabilisation policies. A lender of last resort with the ability to tax and subsidise credit can design a ‘leaning against the wind’ policy that replicates the ‘optimal’ bubble allocation.
